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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
29 registros
| Registro 1 de 29 |
| Autor: |
Streb, María Luisa - |
| Título: |
¿Por qué cumplimentar un código de gobierno societario voluntariamente?: experiencia del mercado de capitales de Argentina 2012-2015 |
| Fuente: |
Documentos de Trabajo UCEMA, n.632. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
51 p. |
| Año: |
jun. 2018 |
| Resumen: |
La poscrisis del 2008 puso de manifiesto la necesidad de mejorar las prácticas de transparencia en las empresas y en este sentido fue reformulado el Código de Gobierno Societario (CGS) de la Comisión Nacional de Valores. La introducción del CGS brinda una oportunidad para testear una iniciativa de autorregulación del tipo "cumple o explica", en la que su difusión es mandataria, pero no hay obligación de cumplimiento. Se analiza esta cuestión desde diferentes marcos teóricos: la teoría de juegos, la teoría de expectativas racionales, la teoría de la economía del comportamiento y los imperativos mandatarios. Consideramos que la autorregulación es un mecanismo válido, aunque vemos la necesidad de un mayor monitoreo por parte del regulador. |
| Palabras clave: |
MERCADO FINANCIERO |
EMPRESAS |
CODIGOS |
GOBIERNO |
SOCIEDADES |
INVESTIGACION |
METODOLOGIA |
INDICADORES ECONOMICOS |
TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS |
LIQUIDEZ |
LEGISLACION |
FINANCIAMIENTO |
TEORIA DEL COMPORTAMIENTO | ARGENTINA |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA D + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 29 |
| Autor: |
Pernice, Sergio - Janssen, Michel |
| Título: |
Sleeping beauty on Monty Hall |
| Fuente: |
Documentos de Trabajo UCEMA, n.587. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
22 p. |
| Año: |
mayo 2016 |
| Resumen: |
We present a game show that we claim can serve as a proxy for the notorious Sleeping Beauty Problem. This problem has divided commentators into two camps, `halfers’ and `thirders’. In our game show, the potential awakenings of Sleeping Beauty, during which she will be asked about the outcome of the coin toss that determined earlier how many times she is awakened and asked, are replaced by potential contestants, deciding whether to choose heads or tails in a bet they will get to place if chosen as contestants on the outcome of the coin toss that determined earlier how many of them are chosen as contestants. This game show bears out the basic intuition of the thirders. Our goal in this paper, however, is not to settle the dispute between halfers and thirders but to draw attention to our game-show proxy itself, which realizes a version of the Sleeping Beauty Problem without the ambiguities plaguing the original. In this spirit, we design similar game-show proxies for variations on the Sleeping Beauty Problem with stochastic experiments other than a coin toss. We do the same for a variation in which Sleeping Beauty must decide upon being awakened whether or not to switch doors in the famous Monty Hall Problem and have the number of awakenings during which she gets to make that decision depend on the door she picked before she was put to sleep. |
| Palabras clave: |
ANALISIS ECONOMETRICO |
MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS |
SIMULACION |
SERIES TEMPORALES |
MODELOS MATEMATICOS |
TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS |
INVESTIGACION ECONOMICA |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA D + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 29 |
| Autor: |
Streb, Jorge M. - |
| Título: |
Nash’s interpretations of equilibrium: solving the objections to Cournot |
| Fuente: |
Documentos de Trabajo UCEMA, n.575. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
23 p. |
| Año: |
nov. 2015 |
| Resumen: |
A Nash equilibrium can also be seen as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, though this is debated because Cournot provided a specific application, not a general formulation. In my view, another of Nash’s fundamental contributions stands out when contrasting him to Cournot. Cournot treated economic decisions as optimization problems, but his stability analysis of duopoly led to endless discussions because players did not use the available information. Nash solves this with his rational interpretation: when players know the structure of the game, they can use the solution to predict the equilibrium. He thus introduces rational expectations. Nash additionally offers an adaptive interpretation: when players do not know the structure of the game, they can adjust their strategies to maximize payoffs. These adaptive expectations were anticipated by Cournot in his analysis of monopoly. In brief, Nash was not only extraordinary as a mathematician; his deep insights allow solving decades-long debates in economics. |
| Palabras clave: |
ANALISIS ECONOMETRICO |
MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS |
TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS |
TEORIA ECONOMICA |
ECONOMETRIA |
MODELOS MATEMATICOS |
ELASTICIDAD |
INVESTIGACION ECONOMICA |
NASH, JOHN F | COURNOT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN | |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA D + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 29 |
| Autor: |
Coloma, German - |
| Título: |
The penalty-kick game under incomplete information |
| Fuente: |
Documentos de Trabajo UCEMA, n.487. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
32 p. |
| Año: |
mayo 2012 |
| Resumen: |
This paper presents a model of the penalty-kick game between a soccer goalkeeper and a kicker, in which there is uncertainty about the kicker’s type (and there are two possible types of kicker). To find a solution for this game we use the concept of Bayesian equilibrium, and we find that, typically, one of the kicker’s types will play a mixed strategy while the other type will choose a pure strategy (or, sometimes, a "restricted mixed strategy"). The model has a simpler version in which the players can only choose between two strategies (right and left), and a more complex version in which they can also choose a third strategy (the center of the goal). Comparing the incomplete-information Bayesian equilibria with the corresponding complete-information Nash equilibria, we find that in all cases the expected scoring probability increases (so that, on average, the goalkeeper is worse off under incomplete information). The three-strategy model is also useful to explain why it could be optimal for a goal keeper never to choose the center of the goal (although at the same time there were some kickers who always chose to shoot to the center). |
| Palabras clave: |
TEOREMA DE BAYES |
TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS |
SIMULACION |
METODOLOGIA |
ANALISIS ECONOMETRICO |
MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS |
PROBABILIDAD |
INDICADORES |
INVESTIGACION ECONOMICA |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA D + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 29 |
| Autor: |
Altavilla, Cristian - |
| Título: |
Procesos de negociación en las relaciones intergubernamentales: El Pacto Fiscal Federal |
| Fuente: |
Perspectivas de Políticas Públicas. año 1, n.2. Universidad Nacional de Lanús. Departamento de Planificación y Políticas Públicas |
| Páginas: |
pp. 175-220 |
| Año: |
ene.-jun. 2012 |
| Resumen: |
En 1992 el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos provinciales firmaron el Pacto Fiscal Federal I (el primero de una serie de pactos que redefinieron el contrato fiscal y remodelaron el sistema de distribución de competencias tributarias entre ambos niveles de gobierno). El resultado de este acuerdo (como el de los sucesivos acuerdos firmados) no satisfizo las expectativas generadas, especialmente para los niveles subnacionales, quienes vieron su situación financiera agravaba partir de entonces. En el presente trabajo intentaremos explicar qué variables intervinieron en los procesos de negociación previos a la firma del Pacto y qué recursos fueron puestos en juego por los actores intervinientes, focalizando nuestro análisis en el marco institucional dentro del cual se desenvuelven las relaciones intergubernamentales (RIG) y en la constelación de actores intervinientes. |
| Palabras clave: |
TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS |
PACTO FISCAL |
NEGOCIACION |
RELACIONES INTERGUBERNAMENTALES |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA P + datos de Fuente |
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